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Non-technical summary
Universal child care that is available, affordable and of good quality is regarded as one
political instrument in increasing a country’s fertility and maternal labor market partic-
ipation as well as to equalizing educational opportunities of children. While numerous
cost-benefit studies make a strong case for public investments in early education, the ideal
way of operating child care facilities is still debated. Whereas public providers can be ex-
pected to provide high-quality care but possibly with an inefficient utilization of resources,
delegating managerial responsibility to non-public providers might increase flexibility, en-
larges parental choice and lowers cost. But at the same time this might reduce quality
and contribute to social segregation.
Evidence in the field is largely based on programs for disadvantaged children in the U.S.
such as Head Start or state programs with few centers under public operation. However,
many European countries, among them Germany, rely on a universal system of child care
where public providers as well as different types of non-public providers operate in the
same market. The aim of this paper is thus to analyze the consequences of universal,
mixed-market provision of child care for availability and quality of the service.
The market allows for direct comparison between public and non-public provision of child
care and also for an assessment of various sub-types (non-profit, for-profit) of providers
which are the main variables of interest. The results show that non-public providers
are at least as capable as public providers to ensure availability and quality in child care.
Furthermore, non-religious centers and commercial centers are shown to serve a larger age
range, if necessary for longer hours, and with a larger share of personnel with a university
education. The differences persist when regional and socio-demographic characteristics
are controlled for.
In line with recent studies from the U.S. and in contrast to the theoretical predictions, the
results suggest that commercial providers can – at least when covering rather low market
shares – increase parental choice and contribute to the provision of high-quality child care.
However, they might also contribute to social segregation as they need to charge higher
fees when not eligible for public funding.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Institutionelle Kinderbetreuung in Form von verfu¨gbaren, bezahlbaren und qualitativ
hochwertigen Betreuungspla¨tzen wird als familienpolitisches Instrument betrachtet, das
sowohl die Erwerbsta¨tigkeit von Frauen und die Geburtenrate als auch die Chancenge-
rechtigkeit von Kindern erho¨hen soll. Wa¨hrend eine Vielzahl von Kosten-Nutzen-Analysen
die Argumente fu¨r ein starkes o¨ffentliches Engagement bei der Finanzierung vorschuli-
scher Betreuungsangebote liefert, ist der tatsa¨chliche Betrieb einer Einrichtung auch durch
nicht-o¨ffentliche Anbieter denkbar. Auf der einen Seite ist zu erwarten, dass o¨ffentliche
Anbieter eher auf Qualita¨t achten, was mo¨glicherweise zu Lasten effizienter Ressourcen-
nutzung geht. Auf der anderen Seite tragen private Anbieter zur Erho¨hung von Flexibilita¨t
und elterlichen Wahlmo¨glichkeiten sowie Kostensenkung bei, jedoch haben sie auch den
Anreiz, die Qualita¨t abzusenken oder selektive Nutzergruppen auszuwa¨hlen.
Im Gegensatz zur bisher verfu¨gbaren Evidenz zur vorschulischen Kinderbetreuung aus den
Vereinigten Staaten, die sich ha¨ufig speziell auf benachteiligte Kinder bezieht und kaum
o¨ffentliche Einrichtungen betrachten kann, verfu¨gen die europa¨ischen La¨nder und insbe-
sondere Deutschland u¨ber eine universell zuga¨ngliche Kinderbetreuungsinfrastruktur, die
alle Formen o¨ffentlicher und nicht-o¨ffentlicher Bereitstellung einschließt. Ziel dieses Pa-
piers ist es daher, die Konsequenzen der Anbietervielfalt im Markt fu¨r Kinderbetreuung
in Bezug auf die Verfu¨gbarkeit und die Qualita¨t der angebotenen Leistungen zu ermitteln.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die vier verschiedenen Anbietertypen, die im deutschen Markt
ta¨tig sind – o¨ffentliche, kirchliche, nicht-kirchliche und gewinnorientierte Anbieter – deut-
liche Unterschiede in der Einrichtungsstruktur sowie in der Zusammensetzung der betreu-
ten Kinder und des bescha¨ftigten Personals zeigen. Nicht-kirchliche und gewinnorientierte
Anbieter betreuen eine gro¨ßere Altersspanne von Kindern und bieten la¨ngere Betreuungs-
zeiten sowie vergleichsweise kleine Gruppen an. Zudem bescha¨ftigen diese Anbieter ten-
denziell mehr Personal mit akademischer Ausbildung als o¨ffentliche und kirchliche Tra¨ger.
Die Unterschiede bestehen auch, wenn fu¨r weitere Einflussfaktoren, wie regionale Varia-
blen und sozio-demographische Charakteristika der Kinder kontrolliert wird.
U¨bereinstimmend mit weiteren aktuellen Untersuchungen weisen die Ergebnisse darauf
hin, dass gewinnorientierte Anbieter – zumindest bei geringem Marktanteil – zur Verfu¨g-
barkeit qualitativ hochwertiger Kinderbetreuung beitragen ko¨nnen. Allerdings ko¨nnen
diese Anbieter zu sozialer Seggregation beitragen, wenn sie, beispielsweise aufgrund nicht
vorhandener o¨ffentlicher Fo¨rderung, sehr hohe Elternbeitra¨ge verlangen.
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Abstract
Universal child care that is available, affordable and of good quality is regarded
as a key instrument of a country’s social and labor market policy. As full public in-
volvement in the provision of child care is costly, licensing non-public providers can
enlarges parental choice and relieve public funds. This paper analyzes the conse-
quences of universal, mixed-market provision of child care for availability and qual-
ity by directly comparing public providers to various non-public providers such as
welfare organizations, churches and commercial providers. Controlling for regional
and socio-demographic differences in participation, results show that non-religious
and in particular commercial providers serve the under three-year-olds and respond
to the demand for full-day care. Furthermore, they employ more personnel with
a tertiary education. Hence, commercial providers can – at least when covering
rather low market shares – increase parental choice and contribute to the provision
of high-quality child care.
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1 Introduction
Universal child care that is available, affordable and of good quality is regarded as one
key instrument in increasing a country’s fertility and maternal labor market participation
as well as to equalizing educational opportunities of children (OECD 2007). On the one
hand, an adequate provision of child care facilities makes it easier for couples to have
children, to return to work after birth, and to balance family and career aspirations. On
the other hand, early skill formation can be shown to multiply human capital investment
in school and thus raises later returns to education (Cunha et al. 2006). While numer-
ous cost-benefit studies make a strong case for public investments in early education (see
OECD 2006b, Annexe D for a review), the ideal way of operating child care facilities is
still debated. Whereas public providers can be expected to provide high-quality care but
possibly with an inefficient utilization of resources, delegating managerial responsibility to
non-public providers1 might increase flexibility, enlarges parental choice and lowers cost.
But at the same time this might reduce quality and contribute to social segregation. The
aim of this paper is to analyze the consequences of universal, mixed-market provision of
child care for availability and quality of the service. In particular, I address the ques-
tion how public providers compare to non-public providers regarding served children and
employed personnel.
Most empirical evidence on differences in the provision of child care stems from the U.S.
and concentrates on differences in child care quality (see Cleveland & Krashinsky 2009,
Morris & Helburn 2000, for reviews). Resulting from the market structure in these coun-
tries, the studies compare quality between for-profit and non-profit providers and show
non-profit centers to have the same or higher quality of care than for-profit providers.
More recently, literature has started to include different forms of non-profit sub-types like
welfare organizations, religious providers or parent cooperatives (Morris & Helburn 2000)
and to account for systematic differences in regional availability and socio-demographic
characteristics of the parents (Sosinsky et al. 2007). Their results show that the correla-
tion between quality and type of provider is highest in non-profit, non-religious centers.
However, the evidence in the field is largely based on programs for disadvantaged chil-
dren in the U.S. such as e.g. Head Start or state programs with few centers under public
operation (Barnett et al. 2008, Henry et al. 2006, Gormley Jr. et al. 2005). Hence, they
appeal to a specific target group with probably very different needs.
In contrast to that, European countries often rely on universal child care which is provided
by both the public and the non-profit sector. One example for such a universal system is
Germany where different public providers as well as different types of non-public providers
1In the following I will refer to non-public providers for all child care centers that are not owned by
public authorities. In the literature this group is often referred to as “private providers” although this
term is sometimes also applied uniquely to commercial providers and thus confusing.
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operate in the same market. In 2009, one third of the 50,299 German child care spaces
is publicly operated and about another third is operated by non-public bodies such as
religious organizations and other non-religious welfare institutions, respectively. Only 2%
of the market are covered by commercial centers which are mainly independent and not
part of a corporate chain. Despite the dominance of non-profit facilities, the average
quality of German child care is evaluated medium to low in international comparison
(Tietze 1998, Meyers & Gornick 2003, German Youth Institute 2004). However, as only
minimum quality standards are imposed, within-country differentiation between providers
likely leads to heterogeneity in supply with regard to quality and availability.
This paper provides an overview on the German market for child care using newly available
administrative data on all German child care facilities. The analysis contributes to the
literature by comparing child care provision in the public sector to various sub-types
(religious, non-religious, for-profit) of non-public providers. Further, the study analyzes
various outcomes such as teacher education, as a measure for structural quality, as well
as market shares of children under age three and in full day care. Multivariate analyses
are used to account for systematic differences in regional availability and basic socio-
demographic characteristics of the participating children.
The results show that, although licensing regulation is largely similar throughout the
country, public and non-public providers differ substantially with regard to availability
and quality. Public and religious providers on the one hand and non-religious and for-profit
providers on the other hand tend to be similar in center, child and staff characteristics.
Non-religious and primarily commercial providers serve the market for under three-year-
olds, particularly in full day care. Furthermore, they tend to have lower child-staff-ratios
and employ a larger share of personnel with a tertiary degree. Thus, especially for-
profit providers and company-run centers, seem to fill part of the gap in availability for
children under three and to meet parental needs with regard to full-day care and quality
expectations.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section explains the reasons for public
involvement in the provision and funding of child care and gives an overview on various
countries. Section 3 introduces the German data used for the analysis, characterizes
the providers of child care in the market and explains the outcome measures which are
available in the data. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis, Section 5 presents the
results, and Section 6 concludes.
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Figure 1: Public involvement in child care funding and operation in different countries
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Data on funding (vertical axis) refer to the financial year 2006 (OECD 2009, p. 232) and on pre-primary eduction for
children 3 years and older. Shares of public and private expenditure on educational institutions are the percentages of
total spending originating in or coming from the public and private sectors. Data on provision (horizontal axis) refer to
the school year 2005/2006 (UNESCO 2010, p. 324). The public or private proportions refer to the percentage share of
children from age 3 to school entry enrolled in a pre-primary institution that is operated by a public authority. School
entry age varies by country. The same country codes as in the OECD reports are used. See Table A.1 in the Appendix
for the full names and further details.
2 Child care funding and provision
Countries differ in the funding and provision of child care services. Figure 1 indicates the
extent of public involvement in funding and provision observed in different countries (see
also Table A.1 in the Appendix). As it can be seen from the figure, the 13 OECD-countries
in the upper right corner, among them the nordic countries Finland, Sweden and Denmark,
have complete governmental responsibility for funding and provision. Along with this
involvement comes available, affordable and high-quality child care which these countries
are widely known for (Datta Gupta et al. 2008, Meyers & Gornick 2003). However,
the large public provision yields high rates of family spending that are reflected in high
rates of public expenditure of GDP and financed by high tax rates, which e.g. in Sweden
contribute to a tax-to-GDP ratio of over 50%, one of the highest in the OECD countries
(OECD 2007, p. 71).2
Early childhood education has aspects of a public good (or a “merit good”, Bergemann
1996) with positive externalities which justify public funding (Cleveland & Krashinsky
2Expressed as share of gross domestic product (GDP), public spending on early childhood education
and care services reaches 1.7% in Sweden compared to 0.45% in Germany (OECD 2006b, p. 105). Whereas
in Sweden all of the investments are public, in Germany 0.14% of GDP are privately invested, either by
parents or by the non-public child care providers themselves.
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1998). As societal benefits largely exceed the benefits to the child and the parents, and
thus the parent’s willingness to pay, pure private funding would lead to underinvestment
(Poterba 1996). Moreover, the monetary benefits associated with e.g. lower dependence
on social assistance and better health status are shown to outweigh the costs of child
care by far (Belfield et al. 2006, Masse & Barnett 2002, Karoly et al. 1998). In Germany,
child care centers are funded to around 70% by public sources (see also Table A.1 in the
Appendix). In the case where a center is operated by non-public providers, the governing
organization covers roughly 10% of the operating costs by own resources (German Youth
Institute 2004, p. 88).
Despite the very high level of public funding in nearly all countries, child care centers
must not necessarily be operated by public providers (James 1993). According to Hart
et al. (1997) and Shleifer (1998), two main incentives influence the decision to deliver
a product or service by non-public providers: First, cost reduction and second, quality
improvement and innovation.
Regarding the first incentive, non-public providers of child care could operate at lower cost
compared to public centers as they are autonomous in budget and personnel decisions.
By this they can overcome the inflexible salary scales of public bodies and probably cir-
cumvent the bargaining power of teacher unions. Empirical evidence for the U.S. suggests
that the costs for providing high-quality education are lower in the private compared to
the public sector (Blau & Currie 2008).3 However, non-public centers seem not to realize
efficiency gains, once differences in wages are considered (Mocan 1995). Regarding the
second incentive, non-public centers might provide higher quality as they could be more
able to quickly react to changes in customer demand (Shleifer 1998, James 1993, Weisbrod
1975) or as they have access to other sorts of employees bringing in professional skills and
new ideas from the private sector (Gill et al. 2007, for privately operated schools). Em-
pirical results confirm higher quality in non-public centers, in particular for non-profit,
non-religious centers (Sosinsky et al. 2007, Morris & Helburn 2000).
The main reason for this is, that non-public provision is mostly carried out through so-
cially motivated, non-profit providers. They have no incentive to lower quality as – by
purpose – they do not benefit from a surplus in gains (Shleifer 1998, Weisbrod 1988,
Hansmann 1987). On the one hand, non-profit providers are seen as a probable way to
assure high-quality care as parents might consider them more trustworthy. Competition
as a quality enforcing mechanism fails because center quality is difficult to observe (and
thus to regulate) and parents can be shown to misjudge the quality of a facility (Mo-
can 2007, Arrow 1996, Walker 1991). On the other hand, non-profit providers may also
promote inefficiencies in production due to a limited incentive to minimize costs and to
innovate. Consequently, both arguments have to be considered when delegating manage-
3See Wo¨ßmann (2009), Patrinos et al. (2009) for similar evidence on secondary schooling.
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rial responsibility to non-profit providers. In sum, the available U.S. evidence suggests
that non-public provision of child care can be less costly and of at least same quality than
public provision (Levin & Schwartz 2007). Nevertheless, it is not clear whether these
results hold true in markets with universal child care provision.
Two more aspects might be of interest, when looking at a market of universal rather than
program-driven child care provision. First, if public authorities refrain from provision,
social segregation and inequality in the access to child care might occur as the market
allows for product differentiation and by this creates incentives to appeal to a distinct and
narrow clientele (Kushman 1979, Levin 1987). Recent empirical work shows, that markets
tend to separate providers in a way that for-profit providers with a strategy of quality
differentiation settle in rather urban areas, i.e. thick markets (Cleveland & Krashinsky
2009, Noailly & Visser 2009). Accounting for regional and socio-demographic differences
in utilization as well as considering the various subtypes – instead of a dichotomous non-
profit/for-profit categorization – seems thus indispensable for the empirical analysis.
Second, benefits could emerge from the complementarity of the two sectors. Not only
the different attributes of care may be supplied most effectively by different types of
providers (Walker 1991), but also different providers might have heterogenous effects on
child outcomes. If e.g. served by a catholic center, catholic parents might engage more
as the center is in line with their educational preferences which might positively effect
child outcomes. Moreover, the overall outcome of a mixed system might be larger than
the single outcomes of its parts (Epple & Romano 1996). Regarding availability of child
care, Viitanen (2007) can show, that in the areas of excess demand not only the use
of non-public but also the use of public child care increased during the Finnish voucher
experiment.4 Hence, analyzing the German mixed market for child care seems especially
promising as it allows some insights to both utilization and quality of a universal system
of child care as well as to compare public and non-public providers directly.
3 Data and variables
The data used for the analysis is the 2009 survey on “Children and Personnel in Child
Care Centers” which is a part of the Child and Youth Welfare Survey collected by the
German Federal Statistical Office.5 The data are collected yearly as a full survey where
4For schools, Hoxby (2000) shows that competition is likely to increase the quality of both, public and
non-public sector.
5The data are German administrative child care data (“Statistik der Kinder- und Jugendhilfe, Teil
III.1: Kinder und ta¨tige Personen in Tageseinrichtungen”). Researchers may request access to the data
by applying at the Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the
La¨nder (http://www.forschungsdatenzentrum.de/en/). The Federal Statistical Office which is responsible
for user support concerning the statistics used for this article is the State Offices of Statistics in Thuringia,
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all institutions and centers providing child care in Germany are obliged to report.6 In
addition to the information on the center level, the data cover information on all children
and employees in the center. The information is obtained through a questionnaire to be
answered by the center management. Thus, the Child and Youth Welfare Survey covers
all German centers, with all children and everybody who works there (see Kolvenbach &
Taubmann (2006) for more information).
Although information is limited compared to special surveys on child care, such as e.g.
Child Care Cost Quality and Outcome Study in the U.S. (Helburn 1995), the data is
very useful for the purpose of this study. Regarding child characteristics, a small set of
background variables such as age, gender and non-German origin are available. Moreover,
I observe if the children have special needs due to physical or intellectual disabilities or
learning difficulties. Regarding personnel, the data include maintenance staff (63,226)
as well as pedagogical and managerial personnel (402,121). As the information on the
maintenance personnel, i.e. domestic and technical positions, includes only information
on gender and weekly working hours and as the employees working with children are of in-
terest here, I exclude maintenance staff from the analysis. Thus, the data on pedagogical
and managerial personnel contain variables such as gender and age as well as education,
weekly working hours, field of work (working with children, administrative tasks, manage-
rial tasks) and occupational status. The data for 2009 consists of 50,299 centers, 402,121
employed personnel and 3,050,916 children.
3.1 Types of providers
The main variable of interest is the type of provider, which I refer to as “auspice”, i.e.
ownership of a child care center. German child care centers fall under the auspices of
public as well as non-public providers. In addition to auspice, the data allow to distinguish
between ownership and management, i.e. the responsibility for carrying out the in day-
to-day activities. In most cases managerial responsibility is identical with ownership.
Four main types of providers are active in the German market for institutional child care:
• Public: These centers are owned and operated by municipalities or other local
authorities. They are not-for-profit by purpose and amount to 17,256 centers, or
34% of the market in 2009.
• Non-religious: These are not for-profit centers which are owned by non-public
institutions, mainly welfare organizations. They are eligible for public funding and
Europaplatz 3, D-99091 Erfurt. The author is willing to advise others about access to the data and the
application process.
6Record date was March, 1st 2009.
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amount to 14,299 or 28% of the market. The majority of non-religions centers is
operated by the proprietor institution. However, nearly all centers operated by
parent cooperatives fall also under the auspices of welfare organizations.
• Religious: These are centers which are owned and operated by churches or religious
institutions belonging to churches. They are eligible for public funding. Their
number amounts to 17,924 centers covering 36% of the market.
• Commercial: These are privately managed and privately financed for-profit cen-
ters. Owners can be single entrepreneurs, child care businesses or companies pro-
viding child care for the children of their employees. Their proportion in the market
is rather low with 820 centers or a 1.6% market share in 2009. Commercial centers
are eligible for public funding in nine of the sixteen federal states (Rauschenbach &
Schilling 2008).7
In most cases, the provider has also managerial responsibility but this is not necessarily the
case. Some of the German centers are run by parents (9%) or companies (0.8%). Nearly
all (96%) of the parent-run centers and 60% of the company-run centers are associated to
a larger non-profit organization as this is beneficial in terms of public funding. Parent-run
centers are operated by a parent board and often parents additionally support the day-to-
day business e.g. by cooking, cleaning or accomplishing administrative tasks. Company-
run centers are comparable to parent-run centers in the sense that they are also mostly
organized as a registered membership association. Employer sponsored child care centers
offer all or the majority of their places to children of the companies’ employees. Regarding
their regional distribution, non-profit providers account for the largest part of the market
in the West German federal states, whereas in the East municipal providers have a larger
market share (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). The market share of for-profit providers
seems to be higher in federal states which allocate public funding, such as Brandenburg,
and in areas with high population density such as Hamburg and Berlin.
3.2 Outcome measures
Outcome measures are selected to cover two dimensions of child care, namely availability
and quality. However, as the data is gathered from the child care centers, differences
between the types of providers are assessed conditional on the participating children and
the employed personnel.
7Funding requirements can include acceptance to the overall planning of child care provision, which
is difficult to obtain for new market entrants as the plan is fixed by the local youth welfare office several
years in advance.
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Overall, the availability of German child care, i.e. the number of children in child care
in relation to the total number of children in the respective age group, still differs con-
siderably between East and West Germany in particular for children under age three.
Whereas in the five federal states of former East Germany on average 41% of the under
three-year-olds attend a child care center or public day care setting, this share is consid-
erably lower in West Germany with around 12%.8 The market is characterized by excess
demand (Wrohlich 2008) and German family policy aims at increasing child care avail-
ability until 2013 so that the estimated (overall) demand of 35% (Rauschenbach et al.
2007) will be met. In the age group of three years to school entry, coverage rates are
much higher as children are legally entitled to child care from age three on. Around 91%
of the German children in this age group attend a child care center or public day care
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2010).
The availability of full-day slots or for places for under-three year old depends on dif-
ferences in regional allocation of providers (as shown in Figure A.1 in the Appendix),
but also from socio-demographic differences in parental demand. Cultural heterogeneity
caused by religion, language or nationality of the parents might prompt providers to dif-
ferentiate with regard to the envisaged target groups. For the subsequent multivariate
analysis, I thus use the children under age three and children in full-day care as outcome
variables to measure the market shares of served children for the four different types of
providers. Further, I control for differences in regional coverage and basic characteristics
of socio-economic background (see Section 4 for details.
The Quality of child care can be described using three different types of measures: Either
the structural characteristics of the center such as child safety, teacher education or group
size, the process quality of the interactions between children or child and teacher or
the developmental outcomes.9 Research shows that child outcomes are predicted most
accurately by process quality (Lamb 1998, Hayes et al. 1990, Blau & Mocan 2002), however
a strong strong relationship between structural quality and process quality is also found
(Cryer et al. 1999, Sylva et al. 2006). In particular higher levels of teacher education have
been associated with higher process quality (Sosinsky et al. 2007, NICHD Early Child
Care Research Network 2002).
Regarding the data, teacher education and group sizes can serve as quality measures.
Differentiation between providers is possible as child care quality, and in particular the
8The number of children under three in public day care other than institutional child care is a very
small. In East Germany on average 2.4% of the children are in public day care, in West Germany it is
4.6% (Statistisches Bundesamt 2010). The statistical figures do not cover informal care arrangements.
9Developmental psychologists describe child care quality using two main concepts: structural quality
and process quality (Lamb 1998, Love et al. 1996, Hayes et al. 1990). Structural quality covers all
prerequisites which are indispensable to provide high quality child care. Process quality describes all
interactions between children and also with teachers. The accurate measurement of both dimensions is
done by trained observers using a quality-rating instrument such as e.g. the Early Childhood Environment
Rating Scale (ECERS, ECERS-R as described in Sylva et al. (2006) or Harms et al. (1998).
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required level of teacher education, is regulated on the federal level by a uniform licensing
standard which applies to all child care centers. These regulations are minimum standards
on structural features and impose only basic quality standards which cannot be undercut
by providers, regardless if they receive public funding or not, but of course they might be
topped.
4 Empirical analysis
The empirical analysis aims at detecting differences between the four different types of
providers with regard to availability and quality. These differences might stem from
differences in financial regulation or managing structures. However, as discussed above,
child care supply in Germany is not random. One should expect systematic differences
in availability and quality by region (as shown in Figure A.1) or by socio-demographic
characteristics of the parents preferring one or the other type of provider. The following
multivariate analysis assesses whether the observable mean differences between providers
translate into differences in availability and quality once regional and socio-demographic
characteristics are controlled for.
The multivariate estimations to determine the differences in the probability for serving
children under age three and children in full-day care are run on the sample of children.
The outcome variable A∗i is latent and the indicator variable Ai can become zero and
one. The estimations for both variables are run separately and the term A∗i is used as a
wildcard for both in the following equation. The first measure describes the probability
that a child is under age three. The variable becomes 1 if the age of the child is less than
36 months and 0 if the child is older. The second measure is the probability that a child
is in full-day care. The variable turns to 1 if the daily care intensity longer than seven
hours a day and 0 if it is equal or less than seven hours. The estimation equation can be
written as
A∗i = α + β1P + β2C + β3Xi + β4S + ui (1)
The main variables of interest are dummies on the type of provider (P ) where public
provision serves as the reference category. Thus, the partial effect for P describes providers
differences in the share of children under age three (the differences in the share of children
in full-day, respectively). As the data covers only children that are cared for in child care
centers and micro-level data on all children in the respective age groups are not available,
the figures cannot be interpreted as availability. However, as there is excess demand for
places for children aged three years and younger (Wrohlich 2008), the number of slots that
are available is likely to equal the number of slots that are taken. The estimated figures for
the coefficient on P thus reflect differences in the market shares for under three-year-olds
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(and full-day care, respectively) to public providers conditional on being in center-based
child care.
State specific unobservable characteristics such as variations in the child care regulations
are controlled with dummies for federal state (S), using North Rhine-Westphalia – the
largest federal state in Germany – as reference category. Controls at the center level (C)
include center size as well as dummies for inclusive, parent-run and company run centers.
The equation contains socio-demographic controls at the child level (X) wich include age
as well as dummies for gender, immigration background and special needs for each child
i who is taken care of in the center. Standard errors for this regression are clustered at
the center level.
The estimations for the educational levels of the personnel are run on the sample of
personnel working with children, i.e. 384,002 individuals in 2009. The outcome of interest
Q∗i is latent and describes the level of education. The first measure turns to 1 if a teacher
possesses a completed vocational degree or higher degree a the relevant field and zero if
the degree is lower or not from pedagogy or educational sciences.10 The second measure
restricts that variable to becoming one only for those observations with a tertiary degree
in the relevant field and 0 otherwise.11 The estimation equation for the measures of quality
can similarly be written as
Q∗i = α + β1P + β2C + β3Xi + β4S + ui (2)
Thus, the partial effect for P describes the differences between providers in the share of
personnel with at least vocational, pedagogical education (with at least tertiary education,
respectively), again compared to public providers. Besides the already explained variables
on center C and state S, socio-demographic controls at the individual level of the staff (Xi)
are age and weekly working time as well as dummies for gender and second occupation.
Standard errors for these regressions are also clustered at the center level.
5 Results
Both descriptive statistics and multivariate analyses show substantial heterogeneity be-
tween the providers in the German market. Table 1 gives a comprehensive overview on
10The “relevant” fields of education are pedagogy and educational sciences, psychology or teaching,
as the sample is restricted to persons working with children on a day-to-day basis and does not include
full-time managerial or administrative staff. Teachers in their third or fourth year, i.e. practical year,
of their vocational education (“Anerkennungsjahr”) are considered as having completed the vocational
degree as they are employed like regular teachers.
11Tertiary degree here is defined as having at least a degree of a university of applied sciences or a full
university (this corresponds to ISCED 5A or higher).
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the mean values of the center, child and staff characteristics for the different types of
providers. Regarding center characteristics, the number of children shows that public
centers are on average more than twice as large as commercial centers. In terms of opera-
tion, parent-run centers are often under the auspices of non-religious welfare organizations
and centers offering places to companies are mainly for-profit.
The main indicators at the child level are age and daily care intensity. All together,
3,050,916 children were served in child care centers in Germany in 2009. Child ages vary
from zero up to 13 years as some centers do not only offer pre-school but also after-school
care in the afternoon for children who are already in primary or secondary school. Due
to the German legislation, which guarantees a place in a child care facility for children
from age three upwards, the largest age group served by all providers are children from
3 to 6 years of age. Figure 2 summarizes the distribution of age and daily care intensity
by provider. Religious centers only serve a very narrow range of age groups and provide
only very few places for e.g. under three-year-olds whereas in for-profit centers more than
40% of the places are occupied by children from that age group.
The distribution of the daily care intensity reveals that in particular non-religious and
for-profit providers take care of children for longer hours. In public and religious centers,
less than one third of the children are served full-day, i.e. for more than 7 hours, whereas
in non-religious and for-profit centers this share is at 42% (see Figure 2 and Table 1).
Consequently, these providers have a higher share of children having lunch in the center.
Children below age three are much more often cared for throughout the full-day compared
to children aged three and above. Nearly 60% of the children who are a few months old
or one year of age and still 45% of these of age two are served for more than seven hours
a day.
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Table 1: Center, child and staff characteristics by type of provider
public non-religious religious commercial
center characteristics
number of children 65.2 54.9 62.3 30.0
occupancy 0.90 0.95 0.94 0.97
share of
play groups 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.21
inclusive 0.25 0.30 0.33 0.08
parent-run 0.00 0.30 0.01 0.06
company-run 0.003 0.02 0.003 0.09
N 17,256 14,299 17,924 820
market share 34.31% 28.43% 35.63% 1.63%
child characteristics
av. age 5.3 5.1 4.9 3.8
share of children under 3 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.42
share of immigration background 0.26 0.21 0.27 0.20
share of special needs 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02
share of full-day care (>7 hours) 0.28 0.42 0.24 0.42
lunch in center 0.63 0.81 0.50 0.79
N 1,125,177 784,802 1,116,330 24,607
market share 36.88% 25.72% 36.59% 0.81%
staff characteristics
share of women 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.95
av. age 41.2 40.1 40.0 36.7
av. weekly working hours 31.6 31.3 30.9 30.2
child-staff-ratio 8.4 7.3 8.1 5.8
share of personnel working with children 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.95
thereof share with
no pedagogical degree 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.21
vocational pedagogical degree 0.89 0.82 0.88 0.70
tertiary pedagogical degree 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.09
N 138,929 115,174 143,501 4,517
market share 34.5% 28.6% 35.7% 1.1%
Data Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Laender, Child
and Youth Welfare Survey, 2009, own calculations.
The multivariate estimates presented in Table 2 confirm the results of the mean com-
parisons. Non-religious an in particular commercial providers have substantially higher
market shares at the under three year old children and children in full-day care, even
when regional and socio-demographic differences are accounted for. Compared to public
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Figure 2: Distribution of child age and daily care intensity by type of provider
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providers, the market share for under-three year olds is 4.5 percentage points higher for
non-religious providers and 27 percentage points higher for commercial providers. Further-
more, centers which are company-run are also considerably more likely (13.7 percentage
points) to care for children under age three. Regarding full-day care, children served at
non-religious providers (7.4 percentage points) and commercial providers (3.3 percentage
points) are significantly more likely to be cared for full-day compared to children at pub-
lic providers. Also, company-run centers stand out as the children they serve are 17.7
percentage points more likely to be cared for full-day. Thus, commercial providers and
company-run centers as well as – to a lesser extent – non-religious providers seem to re-
spond to the excess demand for places for children under age three. Further, children in
this age group are significantly more often in full-day care compared to children above
that age group. This supports the observation that the use of center-based child care for
children under age three is motivated by maternal labor market participation rather than
by educational considerations.
Table 2: Probit regressions (reporting partial effects) of the probit child vari-
ables on type of provider
Child under age 3 Child in full-day care
marg. effect (std. err) marg. effect (std. err)
Type of provider
religious -0.017*** (0.001) -0.011*** (0.003)
non-religious 0.045*** (0.002) 0.074*** (0.004)
commercial 0.273*** (0.015) 0.033** (0.015)
Center controls
number of children 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
play group -0.006*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.003)
inclusive 0.010*** (0.002) -0.003 (0.004)
company-run 0.137*** (0.012) 0.177*** (0.021)
parent-run 0.014*** (0.003) 0.009 (0.006)
Child controls
child age -0.068*** (0.001)
female 0.000 (0.000) -0.005*** (0.001)
special needs -0.030*** (0.001) 0.055*** (0.002)
immigration background -0.068*** (0.001) 0.122*** (0.005)
full-day care 0.074*** (0.001)
Federal state yes yes
N 3,050,916 3,050,916
Pseudo-R2 0.0956 0.1494
Data Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the
Laender, Child and Youth Welfare Survey, 2009, own calculations. Partial effects are calculated at the
mean.
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Regarding the personnel, the share of staff which is administrative or managerial is around
5% for all four types of providers (see Table 1).12 The share of women is above 95% at all
facilities, the average staff-age is around 40 years and the average weekly working hours
amount to around 30. In non-religious and for-profit centers, 5.3%, respectively 8.9%, of
the staff working with children has a tertiary degree.13 Overall, the number of tertiary
educated staff is higher, as the center manager is often educated at a university level
but probably not directly working with children. The share of personnel with tertiary
degree rises by 1% for all types of providers (6.8% for non-religious, 10.1% for commercial
providers and 3.4% for public and religious providers). At the level of the center, this figure
means that each for-profit centers has one person with academic qualification (either in a
managerial position or working with children) whereas only every third public or religious
center employs such a person educated at the academic level.
The child-staff-ratio, which is the number of children per staff person working with chil-
dren, is considerably higher for centers under public and non-religious auspice. This is
partly due to the age structure of the children. For children of the age group 3-6 years,
the child-staff-ratio required by law is higher compared to younger children. Since e.g.
religious centers serve mainly children in that age group (see Figure 2) one teacher is
responsible for a larger number of children. As the regulation vary additionally between
federal states, a multivariate analysis is needed to assess whether the differences in means
between providers persist once regional and socio-demographic factors are controlled.
The multivariate results presented in Table 3 show the probit estimates of having at least
a completed a pedagogical vocational degree (first column) or at least a higher degree
(second column) on the four types of providers and the other center and staff character-
istics. Again, the results confirm the incidence of the mean comparisons. Teachers who
spend their workday in contact with children and have a completed pedagogical education
of at least secondary level (ISCED 4B) are most likely to work for a public provider. All
other providers have a significantly lower probability ranging up to 6.1 percentage points
for commercial centers. However, this result is completely reversed, once pedagogical
education is restricted to the tertiary level (at least ISCED 5A). As the results in the
third column of Table 3 reveal, all three other types of providers are more likely to have
people with college or university degree working with children. This is in particular the
case for commercial centers, as already shown in Table 1. For-profit providers seem to
12When including the domestic and technical personnel in the calculation, the overall repartition of
staff in German centers it the following: 83% pedagogical staff, 15% domestic and technical staff and 2%
administrative and managerial staff.
13Tertiary degree here is defined as having at least a degree of a university of applied sciences or a
full university in a subject such as educational science, psychology or teaching. Teachers in their third
or fourth year, i.e. practical year, of their vocational education (“Anerkennungsjahr”) are considered as
having completed the vocational degree as the training period at education school is finished and they
are employed as regular teachers.
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employ substantially more often people with other than a pedagogical degree but when
employing pedagogues they are involved in the day-to-day routines with children although
with the tertiary degree they would also qualify for management positions according to
the licensing standards in most federal states. These results confirm the U.S. evidence
where (apart from for-profit chains which do hardly exist in Germany) non-profit cen-
ters operated by community agencies and churches show lower quality compared to other
non-profit sub-sectors (Sosinsky et al. 2007, Morris & Helburn 2000).
Table 3: Probit regressions (reporting partial effects) of education of per-
sonnel working with children on type of provider
staff working with children
≥ pedagogical voc. degree ≥ ped. tertiary degree
marg. eff. (std. err.) marg. eff. (std. err.)
Type of provider
religious -0.003** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
non-religious -0.026*** (0.002) 0.023*** (0.001)
commercial -0.061*** (0.007) 0.070*** (0.008)
Center controls
number of children 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)
inclusive -0.008*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001)
play group -0.021*** (0.002) 0.002 (0.001)
company-run 0.000 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004)
parent-run -0.004** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002)
Individual controls
age 0.003*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
female 0.131*** (0.004) -0.046*** (0.002)
second occupation -0.027*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.001)
weekly working hours 0.002*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)
Federal state yes yes
N 384,002 384,002
Pseudo-R2 0.1155 0.0637
Data Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of
the Laender, Child and Youth Welfare Survey, 2009, own calculations. Partial effects are calculated
at the mean.
6 Conclusion
The German child care market allows a direct comparison of different types of providers
as the market is largely non-public, with religious and non-religious providers covering
nearly two thirds of the German child care centers. This paper analyzes the consequences
of diversity in the provision of child care in terms of availability and quality and compares
public and non-public providers in the German market.
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The main result of this study is, that some non-public providers are at least as capable
as public providers to ensure availability and quality in child care. However, the results
show considerable heterogeneity between providers with regard to center, child and staff
characteristics regardless of the fact that there are minimum quality regulations which
are binding for all. In comparison to public providers, especially non-religious centers,
commercial centers and company-run centers serve a larger age range, if necessary for
longer hours, in smaller groups and with a larger share of personnel with a university
education.
Differences between the providers occur as they operate in different regions, employ differ-
ent people and care for different children. Access to full-day and provision for under-three
year olds is in particular difficult for families living in regions with high shares of public
and religious provision, e.g. in southwest Germany. Controlling for these factors shows
that the differences with regard to type of provider persist. In line with recent stud-
ies from the U.S. and in contrast to the theoretical predictions, my results suggest that
commercial providers can – at least when covering rather low market shares – increase
parental choice and contribute to the provision of high-quality child care.
However, commercial providers might also contribute to social segregation as they need to
charge higher fees when not eligible for public funding. Therefore, they might appeal to a
narrow, high-income clientele. Children with a rather “above average” family background
could therefore probably benefit from high-quality care in addition to a also “high-quality”
home environment. Hence, if the observed differences in structural features would trans-
late into differences in educational achievement of the children, fostering diversity in child
care provision in combination with the rather lax regulation on quality as it is now, might
be one of the factors which increase educational inequalities before the start of primary
schooling.
The available evidence relying on the more accurate measures of process quality and child
outcomes indicates that a rather strict quality regulation in line with public funding might
be the ideal way to assure quality in provision (Blau & Currie 2008). Unfortunately, the
administrative data does not hold information on parental fees nor on process quality
or differences in child outcomes according to center type. As the two latter need to be
measured by trained observers they can – for reasons of practicability and cost – unlikely
be included in the available statistical data on all centers. However, a focussed survey on
a subsample of centers covering all types of providers (see e.g. the American Cost, Quality
and Outcomes Study) could shed more light on the outcome consequences of the mixed
market provision of child care in Germany.
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A Appendix
A.1 Figures
Figure A.1: Regional coverage of the four different types of providers across the German
federal states in 2009
1.500
public
non-religious
religious
commercial*
*
Data Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Laender, Child
and Youth Welfare Survey, 2009, own calculations and graphical illustration. The two federal states marked with [∗],
Bremen and the Saarland, the shares of non-religious and commercial providers cannot be published due to reasons of
statistical secrecy.
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A.2 Tables
Table A.1: Public involvement in child care funding and provision in different countries
country country share of public comments and figures from alternative sources
code funding provision
Australia AUS 0.631 0.330 based on Rush (2006) the share of public centers is 0.31 in 2004
Austria AUT 0.634 0.730 according to Statistik Austria (2008a) the share is 0.62 when
calculated on center level and 0.67 when calculated based on the
number of children enrolled; funding based on Statistik Austria
(2008b) is 0.83
Belgium BEL 0.964 0.470
Canada CAN 0.887 0.070 funding overall, not exclusively pre-primary, share of public pro-
vision is based on OECD (2004a)
Chile CHL 0.709 0.440 funding for 2007 instead of 2006
Czech Republic CZE 0.907 0.990
Denmark DNK 0.814 0.973 operation refers to the school year 2001/2002 (UNESCO 2004, p.
362); share of public funding based on OECD (2001) is 0.80 in
kindergartens
Estonia EST 0.988 0.970
Finland FIN 0.908 0.910 share of public provision based on OECD (2004b) is also 0.93
France FRA 0.955 0.870 share of public provision based on OECD (2004c) is about 0.80
Germany GER 0.722 0.370
Hungary HUN 0.938 0.950 share of public provision based on Eurybase Hungary (2006) is
0.95
Iceland ISL 0.696 0.910 funding refers to the year 2003 (OECD 2006a, p. 219), operation
refers to the school year 2001/2002 (UNESCO 2004, p. 362)
Ireland IRL 0.886 0.504
Israel ISR 0.776 0.950
Italy ITA 0.935 0.680
Japan JPN 0.434 0.330 share of public provision based on JETRO - Japan External Trade
Organization (2005) is 0.54 (counted on center level)
Korea KOR 0.463 0.220 share of public provision based on OECD (2004e) is 0.22
Mexico MEX 0.832 0.850 same figure of provision in OECD (2004d)
Netherlands NLD 0.986 0.307 operation refers to the school year 2001/2002 (UNESCO 2004, p.
362)
New Zealand NZL 0.624 0.020
Norway NOR 0.905 0.560
Poland POL 0.853 0.910
Slovakia SVK 0.792 0.970 share of public provision based on Eurybase Slovakia (2006) is
0.97
Slovenia SLO 0.817 0.980
Spain ESP 0.857 0.640
Sweden SWE 1.000 0.880 share of public provision based on Swedish National Agency for
Education (2006) is 0.84 (pre-school activities of children over 3);
share of public funding in pre-schools is 0.92
United Kingdom UKM 0.972 0.710
USA USA 0.776 0.650
Sources: Data on Funding OECD (2009), financial year 2006; Data on provision: UNESCO (2010) children enrolled in
school year 2006/2007. If a countries was not covered in these overviews, older figures or alternative sources where used as
cited in the table.
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